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From its first applications in economics, the popularity of game theory has risen and fallen in almost cyclical fashion. The first edition of Von Neumann and Morgenstern' s book The Theory of Game and Economic Behavior (1944) aroused the initial excitement. By the late 1950s game theory has been applied in many areas of economic research with varying degrees of success, from oligopoly and price formation processes (Shubik, 1959; Gilles, 1959 ) to bargaining problems, resource allocation issues and the analysis of social institutions.
At the beginning of the 1970s, authors like Shubik (1971-72) and Hurwicz (1973 Hurwicz ( , 1975 focused on the role of social institutions and investigated their impact on economic processes. However, this tool has also been applied to investigate the emergence of institutional arrangements in a given physical situation or game. In such contexts, social institutions are not part of the rules of the game but are the outcomes of player' s interactions (Ambrosino, 2006) .
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The concept of institutions corresponding to this approach is consistent with Menger' s (1883) and Hayek' s (1962 Hayek' s ( , 1967b Hayek' s ( , 1988a (Rizzello, 1997; Caldwell, 2003; Ambrosino, 2006) .
Institutions as outcomes of social interaction
were one of the economic issues that Von Neumann and Morgenstern had in mind when they began their analysis (Schotter and Schwodiauer, 1980) . They suggested that theory should start by describing agents in a " state of nature" from which the theory will predict what standard of behavior will evolve. Institutions 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern' s Theory of Games and the Emergence of Economic Institutions

Von Neumann and Morgenstern' s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior was intended to develop a theory of individual behavior " based on a careful analysis of the ordinary every day 131
Ambrosino interpretation of economic facts" (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944: 7) .
Nevertheless, the institutional question almost naturally arises from von Neumann and
Morgenstern' s work (Hurwicz, 1945; Schotter, 1992) 1 . In fact, because the theory of games with more than two players makes it possible to define the set of mutually exclusive social behaviors by introducing the concept of coalition, it can be Second, the implications of admitting indeterminacy into n-player games.
When using game theory to investigate the emergence of institutions, it is important to focus on three or n-person games. Three-person games do not correspond to any particular economic problem, but they allow description of the multiplicity distinctive of human relations.
These are the interactions in which coalitions can be profitably formed (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) .
The simplest constant-sum game which admits to coalition formation has three participants (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944 Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) .
A coalition in a zero-sum game implies that the two allies get exactly what the excluded party loses. The purpose of the theory is not to predict which coalition will form. Rather, the theory points out that it would be irrational if no coalition was formed. A consistent theory of three-person zero-sum games will result from looking for solutions that are not single imputations, but rather a system of imputations (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944: 36) , where an imputation is a given distribution of gains among the players.
A set of imputations is a solution if each imputation included in the set is not dominated by the others and every imputation in the set dominates some solutions outside the set.
Hence a solution is not defined with the attributes of existence and uniqueness; rather, it is defined a property of the set that characterizes all possible solutions.
When the concept of solution has been described, the analogy between institutions or standards of behavior and the described set of imputations arises. (Schotter, 1992: 107) . In the words of Shubik, Von Neumann was even more committed than Morgenstern to the idea of a solution as a set of imputations (Shubik, 1992 Schotter, 1979, 1980; Schotter, 1981 properties of the equilibrium of games, and not properties of the game description (Schotter, 1981) . Contrary to Hurwicz (1973 Hurwicz ( , 1975 . 3 Schotter recalls Morgenstern (1941 Morgenstern ( ,1963 Morgenstern ( , 1972 .
Von Neumann and Morgenstern suggest that
4 Sudgen(1986); Young (1991 Young ( , 1993 , Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990) ; Greif (1989 Greif ( , 1994 ; Blowes (2000) ; Aoki (2001) .
5
Evolutionary game thoery originated in biology Lewontin (1961); Maynard Smith (1972) ; Maynard Smith's work was followed by Axelrod (1984) .
enriched by Hayek' s theory (1945) that concerns itself with the unplanned or unconscious interaction of social agents in order to investigate the spontaneous or unintended social institutions they create (Schotter, 1981) . Schotter (1981: 21) believes In Hayek the evolution of institutions is a cultural process (Hayek, 1988 , Caldewell, 2004 7
The non-cooperative part of the book exludes the concept of indeterminacy. Societies in the real world select one mode of bhevior to solve recurrent problems, so that a deterministic thory is possible. Indeterminacy is important in cross cultural analysis (Schotter, 2007) . being obvious why that particular pair is chosen" (Schotter, 1981: 14) . It becomes clear that a stable institutional arrangement depends closely on the history of how the game has been played.
In Schotter' s model, indeterminacy is resolved by modeling the emergence of institutions as a stochastic process in which the equilibrium determines the state in which the expectations of all the players are such that they all expect the others to behave in a particular manner with probability equal to one; and that is exactly what they will see happen (Schotter, 1981) .
Before setting out his mathematical model, However, the stringent assumptions (players'
rational behavior, problems of non-cooperative prisoner's dilemma type) necessary to achieve this goal force Schotter to almost entirely omit those aspects of the institution-creation processes related to individual cognition (learning processes, routine development), although he acknowledges their importance.
As in Hayek (1945) , institutions perform an essential informative function. They " codify memory" , so that the social interactions described by the game of imperfect recall can be transformed into games of institution-assigned perfect recall (Schotter, 1981: 109 There could be pre-existing innate biases or cognitive processes that make a certain solution to a recurrent interaction problem more natural than others and that thus influence the probability that exactly that solution will arise (Schotter, 1981) . behavior (Schotter, 1981 ).
Schotter' s awareness of the complexity of the institutions-creation processes is even more evident in his later inquiries. After the 1980s his interest gradually moved from pure theory to an experimental approach (Schotter, 2007) .
In the last ten years his research interest has returned to institutions. His aim is now to investigate experimentally how each generation of agents can influence its successor' s behavior so that social conventions appear to emerge over time and are passed from generation to generation. Social learning plays a crucial role in this process Schotter, 1999, 2003; Schotter, 2003; Schotter and Sopher, 2003 ). From the outset, he has taken a quite distinctive approach to game theory 9 . Fascinated by the complexity of social issues, Schelling finds game theory a useful tool with which to investigate that complexity and to understand reality (Dodge, 2006) . Throughout his career, his research approach has been characterized by a combination of empirical and theoretical inquiries (Schelling, 1960 (Schelling, , 1984 (Schelling, , 2006 ).
Schelling' s work is not directly aimed at investigating the role and the rise of institutions. However, his entire inquiry is based on the study of decision processes characterized by the interdependence of player' s choices (Schelling, 1960 (Schelling, , 1961 (Schelling, , 1978 (Schelling, , 2006 (Ambrosino, 2006) . Schelling (1960 Schelling ( , 1978 applies what he refers to as a less restrictive and formalized definition of game theory to investigate individual interaction processes.
Game theory -defined as the study of how rational agents choose when the best choice between two or more possible alternatives depends on the choices that others have to make -is the framework in which many types of situations can be analyzed (Schelling, 1960 (Schelling, , 2006 Neither simple cooperative game theory nor pure non-cooperative games models are able entirely to handle the complexity of the coexistence of conflict and common interest (Schelling, 1958) .
What is needed is a theory that identifies the perceptual and suggestive element involved in the process producing the player' s mutually consistent expectations, and in which the structural elements of the strategic interaction are investigated (Schelling, 1960   84) . Game theory, which began as a theory of protection against interaction, becomes in Schelling' s conceptualization of mixed-motive games the theory of strategic interaction (Bernard, 1964: 444). Schelling (1960) , far from considering the results obtained by the theory of the zero-sum game as useless, developed his theory of bargaining games or mixed-motive games 11 .
These games better represent those interaction situations that, though characterized by some degree of conflict, entail mutual dependence as a feature of the game, and in which some kind of, tacit or explicit, collaboration or mutual accommodation is needed to avoid mutual disaster (Schelling, 1960 When players perform mixed motive games in the real world, they are able to solve the problem.
Moreover, they certainly do conspicuously better that any chance methods would have permitted (Schelling, 1960) . This means that expectations can be tacitly and mutually coordinated to achieve a solution that does not depend on the logical structure of the game, but rather is determined by something that is fairly arbitrary (Schelling, 1960) . Most tacit bargaining situations provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point for each person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do (Schelling, 1960) . On being 11 Schelling, (1958) . Figure. 1 Schelling (1960: 342) (Schelling, 1960) .
The main feature of the focal point makes it evident that indeterminacy is an important aspect of the theory of interdependent decisions. Focal 13 Sudgen and Zamarron (2006) .
14 Players in Schelling act according to their own interest but they are not necessarily selfish. This difference between self-interest and selfishness is also relevant in Hayek's theory (Hayek , 1967) . be as important in explicit interaction (Schelling, 1960) .
The institutional nature of the focal point in not strictly tacit social interaction stems from the same consideration that Schelling makes when analyzing coordination problems. Moreover, the existence of precedents has a great influence which often exceeds the logical importance of other solutions (Schelling, 1960) . This indicates that also in explicit bargaining the focal point which emerges as the solution to a specific problem is able to stabilize itself into a consolidated rule.
There is one more reason for focusing on Schelling' s arguments on explicit bargaining.
These games are of the same kind as those which game theory terms cooperative games.
When cooperative games involve more than two players, von Neumann and Morgenstern point out that coalitions among players may arise.
It seems from the previous discussion that (Bernard, 1954) . It defines players as trying to change their opponent' s payoff and their tactics. Schelling argues that in so complex a social interaction the object of each player' s strategy is no longer to make the best of the situation but to " manipulate" the opponent to change the situation (Bernard, 1954) . Agents will use strategies to form coalitions whenever they can lead them to a solution. The emergence of possible coalitions does not imply that the outcome of the game can be considered predetermined or planned by the agents. Each player' s strategy is aimed at finding a common solution, which is better than no solution at all.
What solution emerges from the interaction is a consequence of the dynamics and the features of the game, and of the agent' s psychological characteristics.
The ability of players to coordinate their behavior in situations in which their interests are totally or partially opposed, and in which communication is partially permitted, indicates that the existence of focal points enables players to transform a worst situation into a better one in which partial cooperation is possible (Leeson et al., 2006) . But it does not mean that it is possible to predict which focal point will be the solution or that the solution will be planned by the players.
The importance and complexity of mutual perception processes, and the difference between self-interest and the unplanned outcome that players actually achieve in their interaction, is well emphasized in Schelling' s Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978) . In this book Schelling investigates the relationship between individual' s behavior characteristics and the characteristics of the aggregate (Schelling, 1978) . In this case, too, the field of inquiry is the interdependent decision process. Schelling main contention is that many social situations are structured so that individual players, behaving in a self-interested way, may jointly produce an outcome that is collectively less than optimal. In many social interactions, people' s behavior depends on how many are behaving in a particular way (Schelling, 1978) . The point is that there is a critical mass level that once reached makes the process selfsustaining. In the case of the rise of social norms from agent' s interaction, it may happen that a particularly institution becomes hard to change even if everyone recognizes that it is inferior to many possible others. Hayek's theory of the emergence of institutions from social interaction is closely linked to his theory of the mind (Rizzello, 1997; Caldwell, 2003 Caldwell, , 2004 Ambrosino, 2006) .
In Hayek (1952) (Hayek, 1952) .
Institutions constitute the framework that enables heterogeneous agents to coordinate their behavior in a social context characterized by uncertainty and only partial information (Hayek, 1967) .
The spontaneous social order emerging from a cultural evolution process and enabling agents to select the more profitable institutions to coordinate social behavior is the unplanned outcome of social interactions in which individual' s actions are the result of such complex perception and classification processes.
Coordination is itself the product of the ability of heterogeneous agents to recognize the action patterns of other individuals by perceiving their own action patterns (Hayek, 1967: 57) .
The spontaneous order is in some respects the " effect" of the sensory order. It becomes an endless process composed of two main elements: first, agents mutually perceive and classify their behavior so as to decide their own action; second, a multitude of agents with partial and idiosyncratic knowledge of the context understand how to coordinate (Hayek, 1937 (Hayek, , 1945 (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944: 11) , it is based on the assumption of the perfect rationality of players. If the importance of certain biological and cognitive determinants in shaping individual' s behavior is assumed, then different theories are needed to explain institution-creation processes (Schotter, 1981) . Schotter explicitly refers to
Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict (1960) , that provides evidence for the existence of " natural solutions" in coordination problems and explains them as the result of similar forms of cultural training (Schotter, 1981 Schelling does not reject the assumption of the player' s perfect rationality. He suggests that rationality is not simply constituted by the cold logical ability to calculate the best choice to make; rather it includes the ability to perceive when the solution of an interaction situation involves psychological or cultural or even more complex aspects of cognition (Schelling, 1960) .
These psychological features must be included in the analysis of bargaining processes (Ambrosino and Biancone, 2013) . Schelling's methodological approach releases strictly formal models. This suggests that they make it impossible to include all those features of the game that have an important role in enabling players to reach a common solution (Schelling, 1960 Schelling' s methodological choice, on the other hand, suggests that Schotter's (1981) difficulties in developing a formal model including the individual cognitive processes considered by Hayek can be overcome by releasing strictly mathematical models, and by moving toward a mixture of " pure" and " applied" research (Schelling, 2006) (Gauthier, 1975; Sudgen, 1995; Janssen, 2001) , and experimental applications have been conditioned by the need for perfectly controlled conditions in the experimental set up Sugden, 1990, 1994; Radner and Schotter, 1989; Roth, 1985; Roth and Murnighan, 1982) . But all these inquiries seem to forget the original purpose of Schelling' s methodological choices:
" motivation for pure theory came almost exclusively from my preoccupation with (and fascination with) " applied" problems; and the clarification of theoretical ideas were absolutely dependent on an identification of live examples" (Schelling, 1993: 18) .
But perhaps something is about to change: the Nobel Prize' s wishes seem to be picked out by
Schotter' s more recent works in which he experimentally investigates the rise of social conventions in intergenerational games Schotter, 1999, 2003; Schotter, 2003; Schotter and Sopher, 2003) .
Schotter developed his interest in applied research during the 1970s when he undertook his first experimental work (Schotter, 2007) . Since then, Schotter has grown increasingly aware that the refinements achieved by pure game theory contribute more to the philosophy of science than to economics. He maintains that economics needs tools with which to test theories and to understand real economic processes. Hence, his experimental research is based on strong theoretical hypotheses and uses the game theory framework to describe social interaction, but its aim is to investigate the processes through which agents make their decisions in social interaction. achieved great formal refinement and has become a normative theory of behavior (Aumann, 1985) . At the same time, experimental applications of game theory have often adhered
to this mathematical refinement rather than considering game theory as simply a reasoning framework. The results arising from both Schelling' s and Schotter' s recent works suggest that there is still place to develop an interdisciplinary and experimental inquiry to understand the micro-foundations of institutions which encompasses both the relevance of cognitive determinants and the complexity of social interactions.
